Schuster Aguiló LLP successfully defended two discrimination claims before the First Circuit Court of Appeals

In García v. Bristol-Myers Squibb, a sex discrimination case, the First Circuit affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff’s claims on summary judgment.  The Court held that plaintiff could not establish that the reasonable, non-discriminatory reason for her termination was pretextual, nor that the true reason was a discriminatory animus.

 In Torrech v. General Electric Company, the First Circuit also upheld the District Court’s judgment dismissing plaintiff’s age discrimination claim on summary judgment.  The First Circuit held that plaintiff had not been constructively terminated, but that, rather, he had voluntarily resigned.  Therefore, plaintiff did not carry his burden to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination.  Moreover, the Court indicated that, even if it were assumed that Torrech established a prima facie case, he was unable to establish pretext, or discriminatory animus, on the part of GE.

Schuster Aguiló LLP successfully defended Pfizer in two cases before the First Circuit Court of Appeals

In Fernández v. Pfizer, a case dealing with employer immunity under the Puerto Rico Worker’s Compensation Act, the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of wrongful death claims against the Company related to an assault by a co-worker lacking in apparent motive. The Court further affirmed the grant of a re-litigation injunction precluding appellants from re-litigating the same claims in state Court.

In Ruiz v. Pfizer, the First Circuit affirmed the dismissal of perceived disability claims. This last case presented an issue of first impression in the First Circuit. In its opinion, the Court of Appeals noted the Supreme Court’s suggestion in Sutton v. United Airlines, 527 U.S. 471, 489 (1999), that “regarded as claims require a higher level of specificity than other claims.” It held that Pfizer’s recognition of plaintiff’s impairment, as suggested by her treating physician’s recommendations, and its unwillingness to provide plaintiff with an accommodation to which she was not entitled, does not transform plaintiff’s claim into regarded as discrimination. The Court explained that to hold otherwise “would be tantamount to allowing a failure to accommodate claim in through the back door.”